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Abstract
Doesmore competition lead tomore information production and greater investment eﬃciency?
is question is largely unexplored in the finance literature. is paper provides both a model
and a series of extensive empirical tests. e model features a two-stage Bayesian game in dif-
ferentiated products market competition. We find that competition causes firms to acquire less
information and investments become more ineﬃcient relative to a first best case with the same
market structure. Empirically the panel regression analysis provides strong support for the the-
ory and shows that investment is more eﬃcient in concentrated industries.
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I. Introduction
Ever since the seminal economic treatise of Joseph Schumpeter (Schumpeter (1962)), economists
have been interested in understanding the role of the competitive environment in promoting inno-
vative activity. e theory of the economics of information has arguably played a leading role in
recent times in explaining firm and financial market behavior. Clearly information acquisition has
a lot to do with successful innovation, which not only benefits firm stakeholders but society in gen-
eral.
One important area that has seen considerable research activity is that of firmdisclosure policies.
Since the seminal articles of Verrecchia (1983) andDarrough and Stoughton (1990) there have been
many studies that investigate the connection betweenmarket structure, potential entry andwhether
firms disclose useful information in public markets. ese studies universally assume that the firm
already possesses the information it considers disclosing.
is paper, by contrast, considers a strategic game of information acquisition where market
structure plays a major role in determining the nature of information acquired by firms in the first
place. With an intensely competitive environment, it seems intuitive that firms will be reluctant
to voluntarily disclose information. erefore if information is to enter prices and quantities sold
in product markets it would appear that this necessitates larger numbers of firms all acquiring in-
formation. But when incentives for information collection are considered, the payoﬀ from a single
firm expending resources on information collection activities ismitigatedwhen there aremore firms
outstanding. is provides a countervailing eﬀect. e central question we investigate is whether a
more concentrated or a more competitive environment is better from the standpoint of economic
eﬃciency when it comes to investment.
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In developing any testable theory, one critical complication is that information production ac-
tivities are generally unobservable. is is because it is oen diﬃcult tomeasure these costs directly;
they are intermingled with other costs and further some costs are nonpecuniary and therefore only
observed at the managerial level. Motivated by this challenge, our paper develops a theory which
connects information production activities with investment costs of firms, and thereby develops a
predictive relation which we are then able to bring to the data in the form of testable hypotheses.
Specifically we build a simple model of information production where a set of 𝑛 firms acquires
information that is relevant to consumer demand. e information acquisition phase is the first of a
two-stage Bayesian game of imperfect information which culminates in investment and production
decisions. Because the market is characterized by diﬀerentiated products, we can consider the full
range of outcomes from perfect competition to monopolies. Moreover, competition can be defined
by the number of firms in the industry or the market shares as in the Hirfindahl-Hirschman Index.
Performance in ourmodel ismeasured by the deviation between the investment costs of firms based
on their outputs using their own information as compared to that of the full information case that
would be obtained if a large number of firms pooled their private signals. erefore an important
feature of our model is that the first best benchmark is also a function of industry concentration
levels. Our most important results are that (1) firms overinvest in terms of investment expenditure
as compared to the full information case; (2) investment eﬃciency is increasing with lower degrees
of competition and (3) larger firms exhibit greater eﬃciencies than do small firms, when firm size
is aligned with lower unit costs of production. As a result the impact of competitive structure on
information is more pronounced for small as compared with large firms. Hence the theoretical
part of the paper confirms the Schumpeterian viewpoint that industry concentration is beneficial
in terms of investment eﬃciency.
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e intuition for our main result concerns the way in which firms utilize signals to form their
beliefs about rivals' actions in the product market equilibrium and the consequences for the payoﬀ
to investment in information production. Consider first what happenswith respect to a fixed level of
information precision. Aer observation of a signal, a given firm forms expectations of other firms'
signals that are equal to this signal. With increasing degrees of competition, the product market
reaction function with respect to its own signal has greater sensitivity than in a less competitive en-
vironment. Further, in the noncooperative game of selecting signal precisions, information signals
are strategic substitutes. is means that with higher levels of competition the payoﬀ to investment
in precision is lower. Putting these two insights together we find that with more competition firms
invest less in obtaining precise signals. Nevertheless their production activities in equilibrium re-
act more strongly to whatever signal is observed. With the full vector of production activities, this
means there is a greater deviation of industry output from a full information outcome where every
firm observed perfect information. When costs are a convex function of production levels, the ex-
pected deviation from the full information outcome is greater with more competition. Hence there
is greater ineﬃciency with competition, or equivalently lower ineﬃciency with industry concentra-
tion.
In the second part of the paper we test the model empirically, using panel regression techniques
based on data from the period 1980--2012. In this case the investment ineﬃciency measure is ob-
tained by using an empirical model of optimal investment due to Richardson (2006). We find that
competition is positively related to investment ineﬃciency when competition is either measured by
the empirical Hirfindahl-Hirschman Index or the number of firms in an industry. ere are also
nonlinear eﬀects as well. We also confirm strong support for our hypothesis that larger firms are less
negatively aﬀected by competition. Additionally we consider an alternative empirical specification
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for investment ineﬃciency that is based on downstream industry variables. is approach avoids
using firm-level information which itself might be ineﬃcient. We then perform a series of robust-
ness checks on the data. First, endogeneity in the degree of competition is checked for by using
other variables that are less likely to be influenced by the investment level of the firm. Second we
utilize an alternativemethod based on the Lerner index of price cost margin. In all cases, our results
are strongly maintained. Last, we explore alternative explanations for our empirical results. In this
respect we find that private information and the agency costs of free cash flows are not responsible
for our results.
In a closely related paper, Peress (2010) examines a noisy rational expectations model in which
investors are endowed with private signals about technology shocks to firms that operate under
monopolistic competition. Investors in firmswithmoremarket power trademore aggressively using
their private information than investors in more competitive industries. As a result, more of this
information is incorporated into stockmarket prices for firmswith greater degrees ofmarket power.
e improved stock price informativeness then helps allocate capital more eﬃciently across firms
with more market power, thereby enhancing investment eﬃciency. Although our predictions are
similar, they arise for diﬀerent reasons as we assume that firms can directly access information on
their own, rather than having to infer it from stock prices. In other words, Peress does not have
information gathering by the managers which is the focus of this paper. A recent related paper is
that of Foucault and Frésard (2016).
Another relevant paper, Hoberg and Phillips (2010b) shows that analysts are more biased in
competitive industries and that investment and stock prices are less eﬃcient following high stock
prices in competitive industries as too many firms invest. Hence, similar to this paper, it is more
diﬃcult for firms to gather information in competitive industries and to eﬀectively coordinate their
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actions. By contrast it is easier with concentration because analyst bias is not present. e major
diﬀerence to our paper is that the externality of producing too much is internalized only in concen-
trated industries, while in our paper the amount of information gathered by all firms is rationally
anticipated and accounted for in all competitive environments.
e consequences of product market competition for innovation by firms have been extensively
addressed. For instance Vives (2008) considers a variety of models and models innovation by cost
reduction. He finds qualified support for more competition driving innovation activities. As far as
corporate finance decisions are concerned there are a number of dimensions along which competi-
tive forces have been investigated. MacKay and Phillips (2005) consider financial leverage decisions
and illustrate how concentration aﬀects the linkage to a firms natural hedge, the capital/labor ratio.
Morellec, Nikolov, and Zucchi (2013) develop a more general model including cash and financing
constraints.
In the area of shareholder returns, Nickell (1996) uses a sample of UK firms and argues that
competition improves corporate performance using a production function approach. He finds that
evidence is somewhat inconclusive, however. Hou and Robinson (2006) find a positive stock return
relationship to competition. Giroud andMueller (2010) examine the eﬀect of the adoption of state-
level anti-takeover laws, which help to insulate managers from external discipline, on firms in more
or less competitive industries. ey find that the passage of anti-takeover legislation leads to lower
operating performance of firms in non-competitive industries, while firms in competitive industries
exhibit no such eﬀect. Giroud and Mueller (2011) find that good governance, as measured by the
number of anti-takeover provisions in a firm's charter, is positively associated with firm value only
for firms operating in non-competitive industries. ese findings support the idea that product
market competition acts as a substitute for corporate governance.
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When it comes to investigating investment activity, Sundaram, John, and John (1996) utilize
an event study concerning R&D changes and link this to a measure of competition which is based
on a measure of competitive strategy from the cost functions. Akdoğu and MacKay (2008) focus
on investments related to growth options. ey examine sensitivities to the Q-ratios for diﬀerent
industry concentrations and find support for the real options approach. eir paper is more con-
cerned with levels and timing of investment, while we focus on eﬃciency measures.
Our model structure is based on existing work of a number of authors. Vives (1988) is the sem-
inal work on modeling information production in a model of product market competition. Build-
ing on this model Hwang (1993) contains a duopoly model with perfect product substitutes, where
signals are given. Ali, Klasa, and Yeung (2014) study financial disclosure policy using industry
concentration measures and find that in concentrated industries disclosures are more limited and
such firms have a propensity to utilize private placements instead of public oﬀerings. is paper,
as does ours utilizes the census data on industry concentrations to avoid the bias as pointed out in
Ali, Klasa, and Yeung (2009) that occurs using Compustat data for industry concentration because
private firms are omitted.
We set up our model in Section II., where 𝑛 firms are assumed to compete in a diﬀerentiated
product oligopoly. e model is analyzed for Cournot competition over firm outputs. In an initial
stage firms acquire costly information about a common demand parameter for the products. Firms
play a noncooperative game over their information precision levels. Performance is measured by
looking at the deviation of cost or investment, from its value compared to a theoretical perfect infor-
mation outcome, in which signals are pooled perfectly across firms. We solve themodel analytically
for two firms and then extend the results using Monte Carlo simulation techniques to the general
case. We develop hypotheses concerning the level of investment distortion as a function of compe-
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tition measured both by the number of firms as well as by the Hirfindahl-Hirschman index. Our
results are taken to the data in Section III.. We perform panel regressions with controls relating
distortions from eﬃcient investment levels to industry concentration. We also conduct robustness
checks with respect to endogeneity and alternative industry concentrationmeasures. Finally we test
some alternate hypotheses. Conclusions appear in Section IV..
II. Model
In this section, we develop an illustrative model that allows us to draw empirical predictions
about the relation between investment eﬃciency, product market competition, and firm size. e
model includesmultiple firms, diﬀerentiated products, information acquisition and productmarket
competition. e game proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, firms collect information about a
common product demand characteristic. We refer to this as the information production stage as it
models innovation as an information acquisition process which may confer a relative advantage in
the second stage, which is the productmarket competition stage. In this second stage, firms compete
in a Cournot oligopoly given diﬀerentiated products.
In order to derive our empirical predictions, we further define an investment eﬃciency variable
which is equal to the expected investment cost of production given the endogenous information
acquisition vis a vis the full information outcome. is investment eﬃciency variable is then related
to diﬀerent measures of competition. We consider three measures of enhanced competition: (i) a
decrease in the degree of product diﬀerentiation, (ii) an increase in the number of competitors, and
(iii) the Hirfindahl-Hirschman index of market shares.
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A. Model Setup
We begin with a reduced form model of product market competition, representing the second
stage of the problem. We then work backward to analyze the information production stage in the
beginning. Finally we relate this to the competitive environment in the form of an endogenous entry
decision.
Suppose there are 𝑛 firms, each producing a quantity, 𝑞௜, at a price, 𝑝௜, so that the quantity
vector is 𝑞 = (𝑞ଵ, ..., 𝑞௡) and the price vector is 𝑝 = (𝑝ଵ, ..., 𝑝௡). We describe consumer preferences
in terms of three parameters. First, let 𝛼 represent a common component of demand across all
products. Second, let 𝛽 represent the symmetric level of diminishing benefits consumers receive
for each product. Finally, let 𝛾 represent the degree of diﬀerentiation in products. Specifically, we
model the inverse demand function, 𝑝௜(𝑞), as
(1) 𝑝௜ = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑞௜ − 𝛾
௡
෍
ೕసభ
ೕಯ೔
𝑞௝ ,
for all 𝑖 = 1, ..., 𝑛. ese inverse demand functions can be derived from quadratic utility functions
of consumers as in Singh and Vives (1984). In this case, we assume that 0 < 𝛾 < 𝛽. Indeed, 𝛾 > 0
implies that the goods are substitutes, which is a reasonable assumption for goods produced by
firms competing in the same industry. In the limiting case that 𝛾 = 𝛽, the 𝑛 goods become perfect
substitutes and are homogeneous. Hence, 𝛾 measures the degree of product diﬀerentiation such
that an increase in 𝛾 renders a reduction in product diﬀerentiation. Alternatively, we can interpret
𝛾 as a competition intensity parameter: the closer 𝛾 to 𝛽, the closer substitutes the 𝑛 goods and the
more intense the competition in the product market.
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Each firm faces a quadratic cost function for output: 𝐶௜(𝑞௜) = 𝑐௜𝑞ଶ௜ , where 𝑐௜ > 0 is a constant
cost coeﬃcient. To model the impact of the size of the firm, we assume that firms with large sizes
(as indicated by the level of their capital stock) have lower cost coeﬃcients, i.e., 𝑐௜ is decreasing with
the size of the firm.1
Moving back one stage to the beginning, we now allow firms to acquire information about the
common demand term, 𝛼, prior to selecting their quantities or prices in the product market. e
parameter, 𝛼, which represents consumer preferences for the diﬀerentiated product, is not known
ex ante. e 𝑛 firms, however, have a common prior that 𝛼 has a mean of 𝜇 > 0 and a precision
(the inverse of variance of this prior) of ℎ > 0. Firm 𝑖 can exert non-monetary eﬀort to acquire
information about 𝛼. is eﬀort expenditure leads to a signal, 𝑠௜ = 𝛼+𝜀௜, that is privately observed
by the firm, where 𝜀௜ is independent of 𝛼, and is distributed with a mean of zero and a precision
of 𝑡௜ > 0. We assume that the 𝑛 signals, 𝑠ଵ, ..., 𝑠௡, are mutually independent conditional on 𝛼. We
assume further that the posterior estimate, 𝐸(𝛼|𝑠௜), is aﬃne in 𝑠௜, where 𝐸(⋅|𝑠௜) is the expectation
operator conditional on the private signal, 𝑠௜. Specifically suppose that 𝐸(𝛼|𝑠௜) = 𝐸(𝑠௝|𝑠௜) = 𝜇 +
𝛿௜(𝑠௜−𝜇), where 𝛿௜ = 𝑡௜/(𝑡௜+ℎ) > 0. Information acquisition is endogenous in that each firm can
select a precision level, 𝑡௜, of its signal by incurring a non-pecuniary eﬀort cost, 𝜆𝑡௜, where 𝜆 > 0 is
the constant marginal cost of information production.2 We assume that firms cannot credibly share
1is cost function could be derived for instance from amore primitive environment, viz., firm 𝑖 produces 𝑞௜ units of
good 𝑖 according to the Cobb-Douglas production function, 𝑞௜ = ඥ𝐾௜𝐼௜ , where 𝐾௜ > 0 is firm 𝑖's fixed assets (capital)
that determine the size of the firm, and 𝐼௜ ≥ 0 is a variable input chosen by the firm at a constant per-unit cost, 𝑟 > 0.
Firm 𝑖's cost function as such is given by 𝐶௜(𝑞௜) = 𝑟𝐼௜ = 𝑐௜𝑞ଶ௜ , where 𝑐௜ = 𝑟/𝐾௜ is a cost parameter that decreases with
the size of the firm.
2A typical example of such aﬃne information structure is for 𝛼 and 𝜀௜ to be jointly normally distributed. e signal,
𝑠௜ , is a single draw from the normal distribution, 𝑠௜ = 𝛼 + 𝜀௜ . See Vives (1988) for other distributions that also define
aﬃne information structures.
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information truthfully. In the disclosure literature Gal-Or (1986) shows that Cournot competition
and private information about demand leads to non-disclosure while Bertrand competition and
private information about costs also leads to non-disclosure. ese results are extended inDarrough
(1993) where firms do not necessarilymake precommitments to a voluntary disclosure policy. Since
our model is one of private information about demand we utilize a Cournot equilibrium in product
markets to ensure that firms do not have incentives to make their private information public.3
To summarize, themodel setup is a two-stage game. In the first stage, firm 𝑖 acquires information
by selecting a precision level, 𝑡௜, of its signal at a variable eﬀort cost, 𝜆𝑡௜. e 𝑛 firms select their
precision levels simultaneously and non-cooperatively. In the second stage of a Cournot oligopoly,
firm 𝑖 chooses its output level, 𝑞௜, conditional on its own signal, 𝑠௜, without knowing the precision
levels acquired and the actual signals received by all other firms. e 𝑛 firms as such compete in a
Bayesian-Cournot fashion in the product market under incomplete information.
B. Solution
We solve the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of our two-stage game by using backward induc-
tion. Firms are risk neutral and maximize expected profit with respect to their own private infor-
mation. Consider first the product market competition stage given an 𝑛-tuple of precision levels,
𝑡 = (𝑡ଵ, ..., 𝑡௡). In the case of a Cournot oligopoly, firm 𝑖 chooses its output level, 𝑞௜, to maximize
3In an earlier version of the paper we also analyzed an associated Bertrand equilibriumwith strategic decisions about
prices and found that the basic results are preserved.
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its expected profit conditional on its private information, 𝑠௜:
(2) max
௤೔
𝐸ቊቈ𝛼 − 𝛽𝑞௜ − 𝛾
௡
෍
ೕసభ
ೕಯ೔
𝑞௝(𝑠௝)቉𝑞௜ − 𝑐௜𝑞ଶ௜ ቤ𝑠௜ቋ.
Following Vives (1988), we seek an equilibrium in which outputs are linear in signals. Solving
the first-order condition for (2) with 𝑞௝(𝑠௝) = 𝑎௝ + 𝑏௝𝛿௝(𝑠௝ − 𝜇) for all 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 yields
(3) 𝑞௜(𝑠௜) =
1
2(𝛽 + 𝑐௜)
ቆ𝜇 − 𝛾
௡
෍
ೕసభ
ೕಯ೔
𝑎௝ቇ +
𝛿௜
2(𝛽 + 𝑐௜)
ቆ1 − 𝛾
௡
෍
ೕసభ
ೕಯ೔
𝑏௝𝛿௝ቇ(𝑠௜ − 𝜇),
where we have used the fact that 𝐸(𝛼|𝑠௜) = 𝐸(𝑠௝|𝑠௜) = 𝜇 + 𝛿௜(𝑠௜ − 𝜇).
In the Bayesian-Cournot equilibrium, firm 𝑖's output level is 𝑞௘௜ (𝑠௜) = 𝑎௘௜ + 𝑏௘௜ 𝛿௜(𝑠௜ −𝜇) for all
𝑖 = 1, ..., 𝑛. Solving equation (3) for the coeﬃcients, 𝑎௘௜ and 𝑏௘௜ , yields our first proposition.
Proposition1. Given an𝑛-tuple of precision levels, 𝑡 = (𝑡ଵ, ..., 𝑡௡), the Bayesian-Cournot equilibrium
output level of firm 𝑖 conditional on the private signal, 𝑠௜, is given by 𝑞௘௜ (𝑠௜) = 𝑎௘௜ + 𝑏௘௜ 𝛿௜(𝑠௜ − 𝜇),
where
(4) 𝑎௘௜ = ቆ
𝜇
2𝛽 + 2𝑐௜ − 𝛾
ቇ/ቆ1 +
௡
෍
௝ୀଵ
𝛾
2𝛽 + 2𝑐௝ − 𝛾
ቇ,
and
(5) 𝑏௘௜ = ቆ
1
2𝛽 + 2𝑐௜ − 𝛾𝛿௜
ቇ/ቆ1 +
௡
෍
௝ୀଵ
𝛾𝛿௝
2𝛽 + 2𝑐௝ − 𝛾𝛿௝
ቇ,
for all 𝑖 = 1, ..., 𝑛.
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Proof. See Internet Appendix A. ◻
Proposition 1 shows that the equilibrium output level of firm 𝑖 prior to receiving the signal, 𝑠௜, is
given by 𝑎௘௜ , which is larger if the firm is bigger, i.e., 𝑎௘௜ > 𝑎௘௝ if 𝑐௜ < 𝑐௝. When the signal is favorable
(unfavorable) in that 𝑠௜ > (<) 𝜇, the firm adjusts its equilibrium output level upward (downward)
from 𝑎௘௜ to 𝑎௘௜ + 𝑏௘௜ 𝛿௜(𝑠௜ − 𝜇). It is evident from Eq. (5) that 𝜕𝑏௘௜ /𝜕𝑐௜ < 0 and 𝜕𝑏௘௜ /𝜕𝑐௝ > 0 for
all 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖. erefore, when two firms have identical precisions of information, the amount of output
adjustment to a given signal is larger for the firm that is bigger. When the information precisions
are diﬀerent, it is ambiguous which firm is more responsive to the signal, unless the bigger firm has
more precise information.
We now turn to the first stage of information acquisition. For an 𝑛-tuple of precision levels, 𝑡∗ =
(𝑡∗ଵ, ..., 𝑡∗௡), to be a Nash equilibrium in the case of a Cournot oligopoly, firm 𝑖's equilibrium output
levelmust be given by 𝑞௘௜ (𝑠௜) = 𝑎௘௜ +𝑏௘∗௜ 𝛿∗௜ (𝑠௜−𝜇), where 𝑏௘∗௜ is given by equation (5) evaluated at 𝑡∗,
and none of the 𝑛 firms have any incentives to deviate from the proposed precision strategic profile.
Suppose that firm 𝑖 deviates from its equilibrium precision level, 𝑡∗௜ , to 𝑡௜. Since such a deviation
is unobservable, there are no reactions made by all other firms and their equilibrium output levels
remain 𝑞௝(𝑠௝) = 𝑎௘௝ + 𝑏௘∗௝ 𝛿∗௝(𝑠௝ − 𝜇) for all 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖. It then follows from equation (3) with 𝑎௝ = 𝑎௘௝
and 𝑏௝𝛿௝ = 𝑏௘∗௝ 𝛿∗௝ for all 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 that firm 𝑖's optimal output level becomes 𝑞௜(𝑠௜) = 𝑎௘௜ +𝑏௘∗௜ 𝛿௜(𝑠௜−𝜇)
aer the deviation. Since the conditional expected profit of firm 𝑖 is equal to (𝛽 + 𝑐௜)𝑞௜(𝑠௜)ଶ, the
unconditional expected profit of firm 𝑖 is given by
(6) 𝜋௜(𝑡௜|𝑡∗) = (𝛽 + 𝑐௜)𝐸[𝑞௜(𝑠௜)ଶ] = (𝛽 + 𝑐௜)ቈ(𝑎௘௜ )ଶ + (𝑏௘∗௜ )ଶ
𝛿௜
ℎ ቉.
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It is evident from equation (6) that an increase in 𝑡௜ (i.e., an increase in 𝛿௜) raises firm 𝑖's uncon-
ditional expected profit. Since information acquisition is costly, firm 𝑖 does not want to deviate
from 𝑡∗௜ if, and only if the increase in net profit is equal to the constant marginal cost of information
production, i.e.,
(7)
𝜕𝜋௜(𝑡௜|𝑡∗)
𝜕𝑡௜
ቤ
௧೔ୀ௧∗೔
= (𝛽 + 𝑐௜)ቆ
𝑏௘∗௜
𝑡∗௜ + ℎ
ቇ
ଶ
= 𝜆,
where we have used equation (6). Solving equation (7) for all 𝑖 = 1, ..., 𝑛 simultaneously yields
the perfect Bayesian equilibrium 𝑛-tuple of precision levels, 𝑡∗ = (𝑡∗ଵ, ..., 𝑡∗௡). From Proposition
1, firm 𝑖's equilibrium output level conditional on the private signal, 𝑠௜, is then given by 𝑞∗௜ (𝑠௜) =
𝑎௘௜ + 𝑏௘∗௜ 𝛿∗௜ (𝑠௜ − 𝜇), where 𝑎௘௜ is given by equation (4) and 𝑏௘∗௜ is given by equation (5) evaluated at
𝑡∗.
is completes the derivation of the solution to the problem of endogenous information pro-
duction. Before analyzing the solution, we derive the implications for firm investment policies as
compared to a benchmark inwhich firms could conceivably approach the full information optimum
by sharing information reliably.
C. Investment Ineﬃciency
We define investment ineﬃciency as the expectation of the proportional diﬀerence between the
investment cost under incomplete information and that under full information. When the 𝑛 firms
in theCournot oligopoly observe the true value of𝛼 in the full-information scenario, we have𝛿௜ = 1
and 𝑠௜ = 𝛼 for all 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛. It then follows from Proposition 1 that firm 𝑖's equilibrium output
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level under full information is given by
(8) 𝑞ிூ௜ (𝛼) = ቆ
𝛼
2𝛽 + 2𝑐௜ − 𝛾
ቇ/ቆ1 +
௡
෍
௝ୀଵ
𝛾
2𝛽 + 2𝑐௝ − 𝛾
ቇ,
for all 𝑖 = 1, ..., 𝑛. Our ex-ante measure of investment ineﬃciency is given by
(9) 𝐷௜ = 𝐸ቊ
𝐶௜[𝑞∗௜ (𝑠௜)] − 𝐶௜[𝑞ிூ௜ (𝛼)]
𝐶௜[𝑞ிூ௜ (𝛼)]
ቋ = 𝐸ቈ𝑞
∗
௜ (𝑠௜)ଶ − 𝑞ிூ௜ (𝛼)ଶ
𝑞ிூ௜ (𝛼)ଶ
቉,
where the second equality follows from 𝐶௜(𝑞௜) = 𝑐௜𝑞ଶ௜ . Depending on the realized values of 𝛼 and
the 𝑛 signals, the ex-post diﬀerence between the investment cost under incomplete information
and that under full information can be either positive or negative. However the ex ante diﬀerence
can be signed unambiguously. It is important to note that this measure of ineﬃciency is relative to
a full information benchmark with the same competitive market structure. Hence we have isolated
the ineﬃciency only with respect to information and can look at how this varies with competi-
tion/concentration.
D. e Duopoly Case
In this subsection, we analytically solve the model for the case when 𝑛 = 2 under Cournot
competition. e duopoly case allows us to provide intuition for the main driving forces of the
model and of the comparative statics.
In the duopoly case, equation (7) becomes
(10)
𝜕𝜋௜(𝑡௜|𝑡∗)
𝜕𝑡௜
ቤ
௧೔ୀ௧∗೔
=
(𝛽 + 𝑐௜)(2𝛽 + 2𝑐௝ − 𝛾𝛿∗௝)ଶ
[4(𝛽 + 𝑐ଵ)(𝛽 + 𝑐ଶ) − 𝛾ଶ𝛿∗ଵ𝛿∗ଶ]ଶ(𝑡∗௜ + ℎ)ଶ
= 𝜆,
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FIGURE 1
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium when Firm 1 is Larger than Firm 2
𝑅௜(𝑡௝) is the best response function of firm 𝑖 for 𝑖 = 1 and 2, where 𝑐ଵ < 𝑐ଶ. e intersection of the
two best response functions gives rise to the perfect Bayesian equilibrium pair of precision levels,
𝑡∗ = (𝑡∗ଵ, 𝑡∗ଶ), such that 𝑡∗ଵ > 𝑡∗ଶ.
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for 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1 and 2, and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. Let 𝑅௜(𝑡௝) be the best response function of firm 𝑖, i.e., 𝑅௜(𝑡௝) is the
solution of 𝑡௜ that solves equation (10) when 𝑡∗௝ = 𝑡௝. It is easily verified that the best response
function is downward-sloping so that the precision levels are strategic substitutes.4 To ensure the
existence of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, it follows from 𝑅ᇱ௜(𝑡௝) < 0 that 𝑅௜(0) has to be pos-
itive, or else firm 𝑖 never acquires any information. Denote ?̄?௜ as the maximum precision level of
firm 𝑖 at which firm 𝑗 optimally chooses not to acquire any information, i.e., 𝑅௝(?̄?௜) = 0. For the
perfect Bayesian equilibrium to be stable, we require that 𝑅௜(0) < ?̄?௜. Figure 1 depicts the two best
response functions of firms 1 and 2 in the case wherein firm 1 is larger than firm 2, i.e., 𝑐ଵ < 𝑐ଶ.
e intersection of the two reaction functions gives rise to the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium,
which is analytically characterized in the following proposition.
4See the derivation in Internet Appendix B.
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Proposition 2. Suppose that firm 1 is larger than firm 2, 𝑐ଵ ≤ 𝑐ଶ. If the marginal eﬀort cost of
information production, 𝜆, is suﬃciently small such that
(11) 𝜆 < 14(𝛽 + 𝑐ଵ)ℎଶ
ቈ 2𝛽 + 2𝑐ଵ − 𝛾
2ඥ(𝛽 + 𝑐ଵ)(𝛽 + 𝑐ଶ) − 𝛾
቉
ଶ
,
there exists a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium pair of precision levels, 𝑡∗ = (𝑡∗ଵ, 𝑡∗ଶ), in which
(12) 𝑡∗ଵ = 𝑡∗ଶቆ
2𝛽 + 2𝑐ଶ − 𝛾
2𝛽 + 2𝑐ଵ − 𝛾
ቇඨ𝛽 + 𝑐ଵ𝛽 + 𝑐ଶ
+ 2ቆ 𝛽 + 𝑐ଵ2𝛽 + 2𝑐ଵ − 𝛾
ቇቆඨ𝛽 + 𝑐ଶ𝛽 + 𝑐ଵ
− 1ቇℎ ≥ 𝑡∗ଶ,
i.e., firm 1 acquires more information than firm 2. Furthermore, the ex-ante measures of investment
ineﬃciency are positive, and satisfy 𝐷ଶ > 𝐷ଵ ≥ 0, so that the small firm is more ineﬃcient than the
large firm.
Proof. See Internet Appendix B. ◻
Proposition 2 shows that the large firm acquires more information than the small firm in equi-
librium. To see the intuition, we refer to Figure 1. Consider the pair of precision levels, 𝑡ᇱ = (𝑡ᇱଵ, 𝑡ᇱଶ),
on the 45∘ degree line, where 𝑡ᇱଵ = 𝑡ᇱଶ. Using equation (10), it is easily verified that
(13)
𝜕𝜋ଵ(𝑡ଵ|𝑡ᇱ)
𝜕𝑡ଵ
ቤ
௧భୀ௧ᇲభ
> 𝜕𝜋ଶ(𝑡ଶ|𝑡
ᇱ)
𝜕𝑡ଶ
ቤ
௧మୀ௧ᇲమ
= 𝜆.
Equation (13) implies that the marginal benefit of more precise information is higher for the large
firm than for the small firm at 𝑡ᇱ = (𝑡ᇱଵ, 𝑡ᇱଶ). e large firm as such is induced to raise the precision
level above 𝑡ᇱଵ. Given the precision levels of the two firms are strategic substitutes, the small firm
reacts by setting its precision level below 𝑡ᇱଶ. is results in the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium
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pair of precision levels, 𝑡∗ = (𝑡∗ଵ, 𝑡∗ଶ), where the reaction functions cross, as is shown in Figure 1.
Proposition 2 further shows that the ex-ante measures of investment ineﬃciency are positive
so that the two firms over-invest on average. Under mild conditions that ensure the equilibrium
precision levels exceed the prior precision level, ℎ, we show in Internet Appendix B that the large
firm is less ineﬃcient than the small firm, i.e., 𝐷ଵ < 𝐷ଶ. is is mainly attributable to the fact that
the large firm acquires more reliable information than the small firm.
To obtain the intuition for our results in Proposition 2 regarding ineﬃciency, recall that we
define this as the extra cost relative to the full information benchmark. Since large firms engage in
more information production, their signals aremore precise and hence closer to the full information
outcome. Hence the ineﬃciency of investment is lower for large firms. e reason why ineﬃciency
is positive using our cost-based measure comes from the convexity of the cost function. Since sig-
nals are not infinitely precise, production levels deviate from the full information benchmark. is
deviation coupled with convexity of the cost function implies that the average ex ante deviation is
positive.
Next we turn to the eﬀect of product market characteristics on our results. First consider the
degree of product market diﬀerentiation, 𝛾. Proposition 3 derives the result.
Proposition 3. Consider a Cournot duopoly. Suppose that firm 1 is at least as large as firm 2, i.e.,
𝑐ଵ ≤ 𝑐ଶ. In the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, firm 2 always acquires less information when the degree
of product diﬀerentiation, 𝛾, increases, i.e., 𝑑𝑡∗ଶ/𝑑𝛾 < 0. Firm 1 acquires less information when 𝛾
increases if, and only if, the ratio, 𝛿∗ଵ/𝛿∗ଶ, is less than the threshold, 2(𝛽 + 𝑐ଵ)/𝛾, which exceeds two.
Proof. See Internet Appendix C. ◻
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To gain more insight into the duopoly case with diﬀerent firm sizes, we perform the following
numerical analysis. For the symmetric demand system in equation (1), we set the demand slope,
𝛽, equal to unity, and let the degree of product diﬀerentiation, 𝛾, take on values in the unit inter-
val, [0, 1]. e demand intercept, 𝛼, is assumed to be normally distributed with mean, 𝜇 = 50,
and precision, ℎ = 0.1.5 e large and small firms have cost parameters, 𝑐ଵ = 0.5 and 𝑐ଶ = 1,
respectively. e marginal cost of information production is fixed at 𝜆 = 0.05.
e simulation proceeds in two steps. We first solve for the perfect Bayesian equilibrium pair
of the precision levels, (𝑡∗ଵ, 𝑡∗ଶ). In the second step, we obtain a random draw of 𝛼 from the normal
distribution, 𝑁(50, 10), a random draw of the noise, 𝜀ଵ, from 𝑁(0, 1/𝑡∗ଵ), and a random draw of
the noise, 𝜀ଶ, from 𝑁(0, 1/𝑡∗ଶ). We then compute the ex-post diﬀerence between the investment
cost under incomplete information and that under full information for each firm. We repeat the
second step 1 million times.6 e sample mean of the 1 million ex-post diﬀerences is the estimated
measure of investment ineﬃciency, 𝐷௜, for firm 𝑖.
Figure 2 depicts the results for diﬀerent degrees of product diﬀerentiation, 𝛾. Graph A shows
that the equilibrium precision levels are decreasing when the product becomes less diﬀerentiated,
i.e., when 𝛾 increases. Graph B shows that the large firm is less ineﬃcient than the small firm,
i.e., 𝐷ଵ < 𝐷ଶ, for all 𝛾 ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore, investment ineﬃciency is more severe when 𝛾
increases. If we interpret 𝛾 as a competition intensity parameter, Figure 2 suggests that firms acquire
less information, and thereby become more ineﬃcient, when competition in the product market is
5We also use the specification of uniform distributions. e qualitative results are the same.
6It is well-known that the Monte Carlo simulation converges at a rate equal to the square root of the simulation
frequency. Since we use a simulation frequency equal to one million, the convergence rate is only 0.001. However, the
values of𝐷 are of similar order. As such the simulated curves that depict𝐷 are not smooth. If we increase the simulation
frequency to 100 million, the curves would be smoother, but this has no qualitative impact.
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more intense. e eﬀect of competition is stronger on the small firm as evidenced from the steeper
slope for the small firm when 𝛾 varies.
FIGURE 2
Cournot Duopoly Case
e two sub figures plot the relationship between information acquisition, investment ineﬃciency
and competition for the two firm case with Cournot competition. Two Firms 𝑐ଵ = 0.5, 𝑐ଶ = 1
Parameters used: 𝜇 = 50, ℎ = 0.1, 𝛽 = 1, 𝜆 = 0.05.
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E. Cournot Oligopoly
In the duopoly case, we conclude that investment ineﬃciency is more severe for the small firm
than for the large firm. We also find that more intense competition in the product market, as mea-
sured by an increase in 𝛾, renders greater investment ineﬃciency. In this subsection, we examine
the robustness of these results in the 𝑛-firm case. We also use numerical simulations to illustrate
the result.
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Suppose first that the 𝑛 firms are symmetric in that 𝑐௜ = 𝑐 for all 𝑖 = 1, ..., 𝑛. In this case, we
can solve equation (7) to get
(14) 𝑡∗ = ඥ(𝛽 + 𝑐)/𝜆 − 2(𝛽 + 𝑐)ℎ2𝛽 + 2𝑐 + 𝛾(𝑛 − 1) .
It is evident from Eq. (14) that 𝑑𝑡∗/𝑑𝑛 < 0 and 𝑑𝑡∗/𝑑𝛾 < 0. us, an increase in competition
as measured by either an increase in the number of firms or a decrease in the degree of product
diﬀerentiation reduces the level of information precision acquired by all firms. We next turn to
Monte Carlo simulation to see the eﬀect of increasing competition on investment ineﬃciency.
Suppose first that the 𝑛 firms are symmetric and have the same cost parameter set equal to unity.
As in the duopoly case, we employ the following parameter values: 𝛽 = 1, 𝜆 = 0.05, 𝜇 = 50, and
ℎ = 0.1. e simulation proceeds in two steps. In the first step, we solve for the perfect Bayesian
equilibrium precision level, 𝑡∗. In the second step, we obtain a random draw of 𝛼 from 𝑁(50, 10),
and 𝑛 independent random draws of the noise, 𝜀ଵ, ..., 𝜀௡, from 𝑁(0, 1/𝑡∗). We then compute the
ex-post diﬀerence between the investment cost under incomplete information and that under full
information for each firm. We repeat the second step 1 million times. e sample mean of the 1
million ex-post diﬀerences is the estimated measure of investment ineﬃciency, 𝐷, for each firm.
Weuse twomeasures of competition intensity: (i) the number of firms,𝑛, and (ii) theHerfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI), which is defined as
(15) HHI =
௡
෍
௜ୀଵ
𝑠ଶ௜ =
௡
෍
௜ୀଵ
ቆ 𝑝௜𝑞௜∑௡௝ୀଵ 𝑝௝𝑞௝
ቇ
ଶ
,
where 𝑠௜ is the market share of firm 𝑖 in the industry. We use equation (15) to calculate HHI in each
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of the 1 million simulations. e sample mean gives us the estimated HHI. In Figure 3, we illustrate
the simulation results for the cases where the degree of product diﬀerentiation is set to 𝛾 = 1 and
𝛾 = 0.5 in the symmetric case.
Graph A and B of Figure 3 feature the case when 𝛾 = 1while Graph C and Graph D correspond
to the case where 𝛾 = 0.5. We see that increases in the number of firms increase ineﬃciency while
increases in HHI decrease ineﬃciency. e eﬀect is stronger when 𝛾 is larger. When we increase
the number of firms from 2 to 30, ineﬃciency increases from about 8 basis points to about 25 basis
points for the case where 𝛾 = 1, but it only increases from 8 to about 16 basis points if 𝛾 = 0.5. e
eﬀect, however, would be zero if 𝛾 = 0.
Finally, we divide firms into two groups. One group of firms is large, with 𝑐௜ = 0.5 and another
group of firms small with 𝑐௝ = 1. We again vary the number of firms. Likewise, GraphA andGraph
B of Figure 4 correspond to the case where 𝛾 = 1while GraphC andD correspond to the case where
𝛾 = 0.5. We see both types of firms' investment eﬃciency are very sensitive to changing the number
of firms. Larger firms perform better in that given the same number of firms, they out perform in
terms of less investment ineﬃciency. e higher the value of 𝛾, the stronger the sensitivity.
Based on the simulationswe see that the results fromProposition 2 carry over to the oligopolistic
case of 𝑛 firms. We therefore conclude that more competition, measured either by the number of
firms or the HHI, decreases investment eﬃciency. e intuition for this result is as before: the
volatility of production levels in response to imperfectly observed signals interacts with Jensen's
inequality to yield investment ineﬃciency.
Of course in general the level of competition is exogenous. In Internet Appendix D, we show
that our results are are preserved in an extension to the model with endogenous (costly) entry.
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FIGURE 3
𝑛 Symmetric Firms Case
e four sub figures plot the relationship between investment ineﬃciency and competition for the
𝑛 symmetric firms case under two scenarios. In the first two sub figures, 𝛾 is set to 1. In the last two
subfigures 𝛾 equals 0.5. Graph A and C use number of firms in the x-axis. Graph B and D use HHI
as x-axis. Parameters used: 𝜇 = 50, ℎ = 0.1, 𝛽 = 1, 𝜆 = 0.05, 𝑐௜ = 1.
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FIGURE 4
𝑛 Asymmetric Firms Case
e four sub figures plot the relationship between investment ineﬃciency and competition for the
𝑛 asymmetric firms case under two scenarios, where half of the firms are large with 𝑐௜ = 0.5 and
another half small with 𝑐௝ = 1. In the first two figures, 𝛾 is set to 1. While in the last two 𝛾 equals
0.5. Graph A and C use number of firms in the x-axis. Graph B and D use HHI as x-axis. e
parameters used are: 𝛽 = 1, 𝜆 = 0.05, ℎ = 0.1.
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F. Summary of theeoretical Model
Wenow summarize and provide the intuition for our theoretical results and derive two hypothe-
ses to be tested. Since firms in our model cannot collude and coordinate their levels of information
production, information is only gathered when it is rewarded in the form of higher ex ante profits.
We have shown that based on a number of competition measures, firms have greater incentives to
invest in costly information production in more concentrated industries, especially when they are
larger. e intuition is that equilibrium quantities and prices are a function of all firms' signals.
e impact of a single firm's signal is less when outcomes are influenced by a lot of other firms
and therefore there is less incentive to invest in information precision. As a result even if there are
more firms, and therefore more independent signals, overall the precisions are lower and the en-
tire market winds up with less information embedded in prices and quantities than with industry
concentration. We therefore find that:
H1: An increase in product market competitiveness, as measured by lower HHI or higher number
of firms, decreases information acquisition by firms in the industry. As a result, the measure of
investment ineﬃciency increases.
H2: Within an industry, large firms are less sensitive to competition. Small firms are more sensitive
to this eﬀect and their information acquisition is monotonically decreasing with competition.
III. Empirical Estimation
We present the empirical results in this section where we will describe the data, empirical prox-
ies, regression results and robustness issues.
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A. Data Sources and Variable Definitions
We use an unbalanced panel of firms from Compustat. e time period stretches from 1980 to
2012. Regulated utilities (SIC 4900-4999) and financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) are excluded from
our analysis7. Unbounded variables are winsorized at the 1% level. We also use data from CRSP,
trade data from Peter Schott's website and competition measures fromHoberg Phillips data library.
Finally for our ineﬃciency approach based ondownstreamfirms, we use the Input-OutputAccounts
data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and analysts forecasts of earnings from I/B/E/S.
1. Measures of Competition
To explore the relationship between competition and investment eﬃciency, we need to measure
the level of competitiveness in an industry. e most frequently utilized measure in the literature is
the usual Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) that measures the product market concentration of
the industry. erefore competition in industry 𝑗 is calculated as HHI௝ = ∑ூ௜ୀଵ 𝑠௜௝ଶ, where 𝑠௜௝ is the
sales share of firm 𝑖 in industry 𝑗.
Because of recent developments in the literature we employ three diﬀerent HHImeasures. First,
we use Compustat data from 1980-2012 to compute the HHI for all firms in the database with the
exception of financial and utilities. Here we define industries by three-digit SIC codes. Second,
following Ali, Klasa, and Yeung (2009), we obtain the census HHI figures for manufacturing firms
from 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007. ese data are more robust in the sense that they
include private as well as publicly traded firms. In these data, four-digit SICs define industries for
the first three years and theNAICSdefinitions are used for the subsequent three years. Finallywe use
7We exclude them because of the diﬀerent characteristics of investment for these firms. Nevertheless results includ-
ing these are available from the authors.
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the 10K text-based competition measure following the procedures outlined in Hoberg and Phillips
(2010a), (2010c). ese HHI figures also use Compustat data. is is referred to as the HP_HHI
data. In all cases lower HHI signifies more intense competition in the industry.8 We also employ
the simpler measure of the number of firms divided by 1,000 in an industry, obtained also from
Compustat data. Here the number of firms is a proxy for increasing competition.
2. Measure of Ineﬃciency
e principal dependent variable in our analysis is investment ineﬃciency. Ineﬃciency is the
deviation of the firm's investment expenditures from its full information outcome. In order to mea-
sure this we employ a popular model of eﬃcient investment from the accounting literature due to
Richardson (2006). Richardson shows that the optimal investment level of a firm is related to its
growth opportunities, leverage, cash, size, stock return and lagged investment. Recall that our the-
oretical eﬃcient investment benchmark represents all available information including signals of
firms other than the one in question. It also depends on competition. erefore we slightly gener-
alize the Richardson model to allow for competition neasures as an additional explanatory variable.
We estimate the optimal investment relation over all firms and years. Equation (16) gives the spec-
ification of the regression
𝐼௜,௧ = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝑉/𝑃௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛽ଶLEVERAGE௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛽ଷCASH௜,௧ିଵ(16)
+ 𝛽ସSIZE௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛽ହSTOCK RETURN௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛽଺AGE௜,௧ିଵ
+ 𝛽଻𝐼௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛽 COMPETITION௝,௧ିଵ + 𝜇௜ + 𝜂௧ + 𝜖௜,௧
8Other competition measures will be discussed in the robustness section.
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where 𝑖 stands for firm, 𝑗 for industry and 𝑡 for time. 𝑉/𝑃measures the growth opportunities of the
firm, and involves a residual income model of the assets in place, 𝑉, divided by the market value of
equity,𝑃.9 Weexpect that higher𝑉/𝑃 reduces investment. 𝐼௜,௧ is themeasure of new investment that
consists of capital expenditure plus research and development expenditure plus acquisition minus
sale of property, plant and equipment and amortization and depreciation scaled by total assets.10
LEVERAGE is the sum of the book value of short term and long-term debt divided by the sum of
the book value of total debt and equity. CASH is the balance of cash and short term investment
scaled by total assets of the firm. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. STOCK RETURN is the
change in the market capitalization of the firm. AGE is calculated by the number of years the firm
has been listed on CRSP. COMPETITION consists of various measures such as the number of firms
and HHI.
Since equation (16) is estimated using panel data involving all firms and all years, the residual,
𝜖௜,௧, from this regression reflects ineﬃciency in the model. By construction the average value of all
residuals is zero; therefore to measure ineﬃciency on a firm by firm basis, we utilize the absolute
value of the residual as our measure of investment ineﬃciency, which we label INF hereaer, that is
for each firm, 𝑖, at time 𝑡, INF௜,௧ = |𝜖௜,௧|.
e investment regression results are reported in Table 1. Since we have four measures of com-
petition, we have a total of four regressions. e first column in the table uses three-digit SIC code
HHI as the measure of competition, the second uses the number of firms scaled by 1000, the third
9See Internet Appendix E for variable definitions. Using book to market as the measure of investment opportunities
does not change our results.
10When the R&D variable is missing in Compustat, we set it equal to zero as is standard practice. We have also run
tests without R&D expenditure and by omitting firms with missing R&D entries.
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utilizes the Census HHI while the last uses the HP_HHI. We include firm and year fixed eﬀects in
all the regressions except for column 3 where we only use year fixed eﬀects. is is because Census
HHI is only available every five years, and the fixed eﬀect tends to pick up the variation in competi-
tion with the more limited data set. Higher 𝑉/𝑃, larger Size, higher Leverage and older Age reduce
investment as expected while higher Cash, Return, and lagged investment increases investment.
Firms in concentrated industries invest more than those in competitive industries as the coef-
ficient on HHI and HP_HHI is negative and significant. e loadings on NUM and Census HHI
have the same relation but the coeﬃcients are insignificant.
(Insert Table 1 Here)
3. Summary Statistics
We present summary statistics in Table 2. Average investment is 10% of lagged assets. As for the
ineﬃciency measure, the average INF is 10% of lagged assets, which is about the same magnitude
as average investment. On average, competition measured by Compustat HHI is 0.22 while the
number of firms is 40 in a three-digit SIC industry. We have 60,202 firm-year entries in total for the
investment variables. We have far fewer observations for the census HHI due to the restriction to
manufacturing firms and the five year interval period for the data.
(Insert Table 2 Here)
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B. Summary Evidence
1. Ineﬃciency across Industries
How does ineﬃciency vary across industries with diﬀerent industry concentration? To see this,
we sort firms by their level of competition in each fiscal year. Four groups of firms are formed based
on HHI each year. We calculate the mean of ineﬃciency for each group each year. Figure 5 presents
the average ineﬃciency of firms within the group with highest HHI and that of firms in the group
with lowest HHI across years. e ineﬃciency measure is consistently higher for firms in the lowest
HHI (competitive) group compared with that of firms in the highest HHI (concentrated) group.
We then average the time-series means of ineﬃciency of the four groups of firms by HHI quartile.
Figure 6 plots the means of the four groups. Firms in the first group are in the most competitive
industries while the fourth group firms face the least competition. A declining trend in terms of
mean ineﬃciency is clearly observed, with the mean of ineﬃciency in the first group being 0.10
while the last group is equal to 0.07.
C. Hypothesis Tests
1. Competition and Eﬃciency
We now examine the relationship between competition and eﬃciency using the following spec-
ification:
(17) INF௜,௧ = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵCOMPETITION௝,௧ିଵ + 𝛽ᇱ𝐗𝐢,𝐭ି𝟏 + 𝜖௜,௧
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FIGURE 5
Mean of Ineﬃciency Across Time
In each year, firms are divided into 4 groups by their HHI level in ascending order. In each year, we
calculate the mean of the ineﬃciency within the lowest and the highest HHI groups and plot the
mean across time. e sample covers firm-year data from 1980 to 2012.
FIGURE 6
Mean Deviation Across Groups
Firms are divided into 4 groups by their HHI level in ascending order. We calculate the mean of
each group across time as well as across firms. Group 1 are firms with lowest HHI. e sample
covers firm-year data from 1980 to 2012.
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where INF௜,௧ is our empirical measure of ineﬃciency. Competition is either measured by our three
HHI measures or the number of firms divided by 1000. 𝐗 is a set of firm level control variables,
including market to book, leverage of the firm, cash holdings, size of the firm, tangibility of assets
and the age of the firm. Increasing firm size is predicted by the model to be related to greater eﬃ-
ciency of investment. Firms that are older havemore experience, thus should investmore eﬃciently.
Firms with more cash tend to invest less eﬃciently which could be due to agency problems. Tan-
gibility is a measure of financial constraints, i.e. the ability to borrow. Other variables control for
the fundamental diﬀerence of firms with diﬀerent growth opportunities (MTB) and diﬀerent risk
levels (Leverage). Note that we have four sets of ineﬃciency measures depending on the competi-
tion measures used in regression (16). e same competition measures will be used in both stages.
Namely if we take INF from column 1 of Table 1 where HHI is used, the same HHI will be used as
the competition measure here.
Table 3 presents the regression results. We obtain strong results confirming our hypothesis re-
garding the link between ineﬃciency and industry concentration. In the first two columns, we find
that the coeﬃcient on Compustat HHI is either -0.044 or -0.022 both significant at the 1% level,
without and with controls respectively. Columns 5 and 6 give corresponding results for the census
HHI and columns 7 and 8 provide the result for the HP_HHI. All of these coeﬃcients are of the cor-
rect sign and similar in terms of magnitude. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. We find
support as well by using the number of firms as an indication of competition. Here the coeﬃcient
is positive, as expected.
In terms of economic significance, a one standard deviation increase in Compustat HHI (0.18)
decreases the INF of an average firm by 5% to 10%. We find similar figures for census HHI, where
the economic significance of a one standard deviation (0.06) move leads to roughly 8% to 9% in
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terms of ineﬃciency. A one standard deviation increase in the number of firms (0.06) decreases
ineﬃciency by 9% to 17%. A one standard deviation increase in HP_HHI decreases ineﬃciency by
about 6%. ese results are reassuring and our findings confirm our hypothesis H1 where compe-
tition increases ineﬃciency.
In terms of control variables, firms that are less financially constrained, i.e. with more cash or
tangibility of assets invest less eﬃciently. Firms that are older in age or larger in size invest more
eﬃciently as predicted by the model where information accumulated across the years or more re-
sources could be used to acquire information for large firms. More leverage increases ineﬃciency
while higher market to book ratios increases ineﬃciency.
(Insert Table 3 Here)
2. Competition and Eﬃciency: Non-Linearities
As seen from the simulation, there is a possible non-linearity between competition and eﬃ-
ciency. We test this by including a quadratic term of the competition measure in the regression:
(18) INF௜,௧ = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵCOMPETITION௝,௧ିଵ + 𝛽ଶCOMPETITIONଶ௝,௧ିଵ + 𝛽ᇱ𝐗𝐢,𝐭ି𝟏 + 𝜖௜,௧
Table 4 reports the regression results. We discover a strong convex non-linear eﬀect with re-
spect to Compustat HHI, which is consistent with our simulation results. e coeﬃcients on HHI
remain negative while the coeﬃcients on HHIଶ are positive. e eﬀect is similar for the HP_HHI
measure. Unfortunately we could not confirm this non-linear eﬀect using the Census HHI data.
Here the nonlinearity seems to decrease even the significance of the linear term. With respect to
the number of firms, while the sign is correct with respect to the linear term (positive), we find a
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concave relationship, as opposed to the linear relationship we found in the simulation studies.
(Insert Table 4 Here)
3. Competition and Eﬃciency: Size Eﬀect
Hypothesis H2 of our model is that firms that are larger in size are more eﬃcient and are less
sensitive to the impact of competition. To test this hypothesis, we introduce an interaction term
between size and competition into the regression:
INF௜,௧ = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵCOMPETITION௝,௧ିଵ + 𝛽ଶSIZE௜,௧ିଵ(19)
+ 𝛽ଷSIZE௜,௧ିଵ × COMPETITION௝,௧ିଵ + 𝛽ᇱ𝐗𝐢,𝐭ି𝟏 + 𝜖௜,௧
𝛽ଵ measures the impact of competition and 𝛽ଶ measures the size eﬀect, which is expected to be
negative as larger firms are more eﬃcient. 𝛽ଷ is the coeﬃcient of interest here. As larger firms are
less influenced by competition, it should be of the opposite sign as compared with 𝛽ଵ.
Table 5 reports the results. When competition is measured as Compustat HHI in columns 1 and
2, 𝛽ଵ is negative, confirming again that less competition reduces ineﬃciency. e impact of size as
reflected in 𝛽ଶ is also negative so that size reduces ineﬃciency. Importantly 𝛽ଷ is of the opposite
sign, although it loses significance when controls are added. Nevertheless with or without controls
it stands up in the census HHI and HP_HHI. e size eﬀect on eﬃciency is stronger when there
is more concentration. Firms that are larger in size are less aﬀected by competition in terms of
investment eﬃciency. e results are maintained when competition is measured using NUM as in
columns 3 and 4. e coeﬃcient on size, 𝛽ଶ, is consistently negatively and significant in all settings.
Other control variables have the same sign as in previous regressions. us, our hypotheses H2 is
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confirmed here using three out of four measures. Large firms are less sensitive to competition and
invest more eﬃciently.
(Insert Table 5 Here)
D. A Downstream Based Ineﬃciency Measure
Our previous measure of investment ineﬃciency has relied on the Richardson (2006) model,
which utilizes firm-level data to explain future investment. One possible criticismof this approach is
that if the firm is behaving ineﬃciently presumably some of the explanatory variables in the Richard-
son model such as lagged investment, stock price and cash levels will not be eﬃcient.
erefore, we construct an alternative measure of investment eﬃciency based on on down-
stream industry-level data that the firm presumably reacts to in setting its investment level.11 is
procedure gives us an additional measure of ineﬃciency that we label as INF(DOWN).
Weuse the Input-OutputAccounts data from theBureau of EconomicAnalysis (BEA) to identify
an unique downstream industry for each upstream industry towhich a firmbelongs.12 Weutilize the
Use Table that identifies the amount of a commodity purchased by each industry as an intermediate
input into the industry's production. e Input-Output table has been widely used to identify the
links between industries (for example by Fan and Goyal (2006); Menzly and Ozbas (2010); Ahern
and Harford (2014)). For each firm, 𝑖, in industry 𝑗, we identify a single downstream industry, 𝑘,
the industry that uses themost dollar amount of goods from industry 𝑗. For example, the petroleum
refineries industry is identified as the downstream industry of oil and gas extraction firms. We use
11We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this method of measuring ineﬃciency.
12We use the 2007 version of the data that includes 389 industries. Since the output data for detailed industries were
first made available in 1997, our sample period starts in 1998.
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four downstream industry level variables to which the investment of upstream firms should respond
to.13
We include the total output of our identified downstream industry (DOWN_OUTPUT) to re-
flect the demand from the downstream industry. We also include the average growth in sales
(DOWN_SALEG) of downstream industry firms as a proxy for investment opportunities of the
upstream firm. In addition, we include two variables that are market-based and forward-looking:
(i) the average market-to-book ratio of firms in the downstream industry (DOWN_MTB), and
(ii) the average of long-term growth forecasts of firms by analysts in the downstream industry
(DOWN_ANALYST). Finally, as our model predicts competition levels influence eﬃcient invest-
ment, we include the competition measure in the first-stage regression.
Specifically, we employ the followingmodel that relates eﬃcient investment in firm 𝑖 in upstream
industry 𝑗 to downstream industry 𝑘:
𝐼௜,௧ = 𝛼 + 𝛽ଵDOWN_OUTPUT௞,௧ିଵ + 𝛽ଶDOWN_SALEG௞,௧ିଵ(20)
+ 𝛽ଷDOWN_MTB௞,௧ିଵ + 𝛽ସDOWN_ANALYST௞,௧ିଵ
+ 𝛽ହCOMPETITION௝,௧ିଵ + 𝜂௧ + 𝜖௜,௧
Table 6 reports the first-stage regression results using diﬀerent competition measures. All four
downstream industry level variables are positively correlatedwith firm-level investment, asmight be
expected. Note that the downstream analysis confirms the firm level analysis since book-to-market
was negatively related to firm investment in the first specification and market-to-book is positive
in this specification. Further we find corresponding results with respect to our competition mea-
13Internet Appendix E provides detailed definitions of variables.
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sures since HHI and Hoberg Philips HHI are significantly negatively related to investment in both
specifications.
(Insert Table 6 Here)
Taking the absolute value of the residual gives rise to the newmeasure of eﬃciency, INF(DOWN)14.
e correlation between our original measure, INF, and the new measure, INF(DOWN), is given
in panel A of Table A.1. We find that these two measures are significantly positively correlated and
equal to 0.75 when HHI is used as the competition measure in the first stage.15.
(Table A.1 Available in the Internet Appendix)
As with our earlier approach, we run equation (17) using the new ineﬃciency measures we
calculate using the downstream industry approach. Table 7 reports the regression results. Ourmain
results are confirmed again. All coeﬃcients of the competition variables are of the right (negative)
sign and are highly significant. In fact our results using this downstream analysis are even stronger
than with the Richardson approach as indicated by the higher 𝑅ଶ in the multivariate regressions
and also the fact that the competition coeﬃcients are almost always greater in magnitude as well as
statistical significance.
(Insert Table 7 Here)
E. Robustness
In this section, we vary the measure of competition for robustness purposes. We also separate
samples by either free cash flow or the idiosyncratic volatility of the firm to verify that our results
14e values of INF(DOWN) diﬀer slightly depending on the competition measures used in the first stage.
15e correlation matrices of other sets of competition measures are similar and are therefore not reported.
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are not driven by these two factors that might also be related to investment eﬃciency.
1. Diﬀerent Measures of Competition
All the previous competition measures are more or less endogenous. us, we follow the litera-
ture on endogeneity by adopting trade cost as another measure of competition, which is exogenous
to the influence of the industry. e higher the trade cost, the lower the competition. We also utilize
the price-cost margin as additional measures of competition. e higher the price-cost margin, the
lower the competition level. Panel B of Table A.1 shows the correlation matrix of the eight compe-
tition measures. All of the measures are positively correlated with Compustat HHI, of course, with
the exception of the number of firms which is negatively correlated. HP_HHI behaves similarly.
e census HHI variable has a correlation that is negatively related to HP_HHI and is positively
related to the number of firms. is could be due to the restriction to manufacturing firms which is
not representative of the broader sample of firms applied in the remaining competition measures.
Using the robustmeasures of competition, we rerun equation (16) to calculate ineﬃciency. Table
A.2 presents the first stage result. Ineﬃciency measures are then used in equation (17). Table A.3
presents the result using trade cost (tariﬀ plus freight cost), or tariﬀ and freight cost separately and
EPCM. EPCM is significantly negative, confirming our previous results using HHI and number
of firms. Competition as measured by trade data shows that higher competition (lower trade cost)
increases the ineﬃciency of investment of the firm. e impact of tariﬀs is larger than that of freight
cost. A one standard deviation increase of tariﬀ (0.04) reduces ineﬃciency by 0.00868. Given the
mean of ineﬃciency being 0.08, it corresponds to an increase of a 11% increase. e magnitude is
similar with our previous results.
(Table A.2 and A.3 Available in the Internet Appendix)
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2. Sub-group Results
Giroud and Mueller (2010) find that good corporate governance benefits firms, but the results
are only significant for firms in concentrated industries. Because agency problems are also a possi-
bility to influence firm investment eﬃciency and industries with diﬀerent concentration might also
diﬀer in the nature of the agency problem they face, our results that industry concentration helps
eﬃciency might be the result of an agency problem that correlates with industry concentration. If
that were the case, when we divide firms into high free cash flow and low free cash flow firms, we
would expect the industry concentration measures would no longer be significant.
We calculate free cash flow (FCF) as the cash flow from operating activities minus depreciation
and amortization plus research and development minus expected investment in year 𝑡 as in the
optimal investment regression (16). In year 𝑡, if a firm is below the median in terms of FCF then it
is in the low FCF group. Otherwise it is in the high FCF sample.
Table A.4 reports the results. In columns 3 and 4, firms are divided into subsamples and the
coeﬃcient on competition is considered in the case of the number of firms. We find no diﬀerence
with respect to the FCF subsamples. Similarly our results are preservedwhen looking at CensusHHI
measures in columns 5 and 6. ere is also confirmation of our previous results when considering
the HP_HHI. Unfortunately it appears that the reduction of sample size results in less significance
with respect to our HHI variable in column 1. Nevertheless the coeﬃcient remains with the correct
negative sign. Our main conclusion is that higher concentration reduces investment ineﬃciency is
not driven by the agency problem of free cash flows.
(Table A.4 Available in the Internet Appendix)
Another potential concern is that firms can learn from the stock market (Dow and Gorton
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(1997), Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999), and Polk and Sapienza (2009)). Perhaps it is informa-
tion communication through financial market prices that assists with eﬃciency. Hence we check if
private information stemming from the stock market helps firms in concentrated industries invest
more eﬃciently. Peress (2010) showed that firms with more market power have more informative
stock prices. is, however, was from the view of investors. From the view of managers, insider
trading information is something already known by the manager as argued by Chen, Goldstein,
and Jiang (2007). It is private information in the stock market that is otherwise unknown to the
manager that potentially might help determine investment. emore private information theman-
ager can get from the stock market for free, the better is investment eﬃciency. Following Morck,
Yeung, and Yu (2000), we use idiosyncratic volatility as a proxy for private information from the
stock market. For each firm, idiosyncratic volatility is calculated from 1 − 𝑅ଶ of the regression
𝑟௜,௝,௧ = 𝛽௜,଴ + 𝛽௜,௠𝑟௠,௧ + 𝛽௜,௝𝑟௝,௧ + 𝜖௜,௧, where 𝑖 stands for firm, 𝑗 stands for industry and 𝑡 stands for
time. 𝑟௜,௝,௧ is the return of firm 𝑖 in industry 𝑗 at time 𝑡. 𝑟௠,௧ is the market return at time 𝑡. 𝑟௝,௧ is
the average return of industry 𝑗 at time 𝑡. erefore idiosyncratic volatility actually measures the
returns variation of a firm that cannot be accounted for by the market and the industry to which it
belongs. A firm is in the Low IDVOL group in year 𝑡 if the IDVOL of it is below its mean in year 𝑡.
Table A.5 presents the results. Our results remain strong in each of the sub groups for all of our
measures. is indicates our results are not driven by stock market informativeness.
(Table A.5 Available in the Internet Appendix)
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IV. Conclusion
is paper has sought to test a ``Schumpeterian'' hypothesis that monopoly power is a neces-
sary ingredient to promote valuable information production and achieve investment eﬃciencies.
As such we have developed a model of competition with diﬀerentiated products along with an in-
novation stage in which firms invest in acquiring more precise information signals about product
demand. We find that larger firms act more aggressively than do smaller firms for given levels of
information precision. is eﬀect is reinforced when we consider endogenous information acquisi-
tion. Now we demonstrate that in a duopoly between two firms of diﬀerent sizes, the large firm also
acquires more precise information. Our results in the duopoly case can also be extended to derive
predictions about the level of investment eﬃciency. Here we describe ineﬃciency as the ex ante
deviation between the costs of investment given the specific signal and the limiting case of an in-
finitely precise signal. Intuitively this results from the fact that the larger firm acquires more precise
information than does the small firm.
Our duopoly results are then generalized to more general industry structures. Using Monte
Carlo simulation techniques we have discovered that information acquisition diminishes when the
products are more substitutable (i.e., less diﬀerentiated). In general our result that large firms re-
spond more aggressively is preserved. For the 𝑛 firm case, we consider two types of scenarios. One
is where firm structure is symmetric in the sense that size of all firms is the same; the second is where
firms are either of a large type or a smaller type (with corresponding cost implications). We mea-
sure competition in the 𝑛 firm case using one of two possibilities. First, we can consider the number
of firms as representative of competition. is is an exogenous measure. Second, we compute the
Hirfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is the sum of market shares using the equilibrium price
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and quantities. ismeasure represents an endogenousmeasure of competition. For the symmetric
firm case we find that investment ineﬃciencies increase with respect to the number of firms, and
with a reduction in the realized HHI. For the asymmetric case, small firms retain the same relation-
ship with respect to competition - they are adversely aﬀected. Large firms are as well, although the
results are less significant.
Our empirical test is based on unbalanced panel regressions using data from 1980-2012. In
order to do so, we must take a stand on how to model optimal investment activities and therefore to
measure the deviation fromoptimal practices. We beginwith the Richardson (2006)model from the
accounting literature, as it has garnered wide acceptance. e model predicts investment using the
present value of growth opportunities, leverage, cash, size, momentum, age, and past investment.
Since our theory is about competition we generalize the Richardson model to allow for this as well.
e residuals from the Richardson model are then utilized to compute the investment ineﬃciency,
which is then related to competition. We find very strong results from a univariate regression test
relating either competition measure (the number of firms or the HHI) to investment ineﬃciency.
In addition some support for a nonlinear eﬀect is also included. Investment ineﬃciency is very
severe with either a weak industry concentration or a large number of firms in the industry. Our
size eﬀects are found by utilizing an interactive term in the panel regression. Now, the competition
eﬀects are lower for larger firms. We also utilize an alternative measure for investment ineﬃciency
based on input-output tables from the BEA. Our results regarding competition and eﬃciency are
even stronger with respect to this alternative specification.
Our theoretical and empirical results have been found to be robust to endogenous competition.
Specifically we use tariﬀ and freight cost as a source of exogenous variation that would aﬀect all
firms in the industry but be outside the control of any of them. We also employ the Lerner index
42
(price-cost margin). We find that all of our results remain strong and economically significant. Two
remaining robustness checks are also carried out: we find that private information does not impact
our results nor does a measure of the agency costs of free cash flows.
In closing it is worthwhile mentioning that we have taken the viewpoint that a concentrated
industry is not a competitive one. Other authors, e.g., Sutton (1991) have pointed out that in such
cases, entrywould be potentiallymore attractive, and the influence from the potential entrantmakes
this a more competitive product market. Our model--although it can be generalized to allow for an
entry decision that endogenizes the number of firms--does not consider investment as a motive
for preemption and therefore analyzes these eﬀects for a given market size. is has the empirical
advantage that one can utilize existing data, rather than having to develop proxies for entry costs
and characteristics of firms that do not exist. Nevertheless, a better understanding of entry models
in the area of information production would be a highly desirable future research area in our view.
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TABLE 1
Optimal Investment Regression
e regression is as follows:
𝐼௜,௧ = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝑉𝑃௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛽ଶLEVERAGE௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛽ଷCASH௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛽ସSIZE௜,௧ିଵ
+ 𝛽ହSTOCK RETURN௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛽଺AGE௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛽଻𝐼௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛽 COMPETITION௝,௧ିଵ + 𝜇௜ + 𝜂௧ + 𝜖௜,௧
Table 1 presents the result of the OLS investment regression. We use the fitted value of this regression as the expected
investment as in in Richardson (2006) and the absolute value of residuals as the proxy for ineﬃciency. e sample
covers firm-year data from 1980 to 2012. Firm and year fixed eﬀects are included except for no firm fixed eﬀects for
column 3 where Census data is available only every five years. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **,
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
1 2 3 4
Variables 𝐼௜,௧ 𝐼௜,௧ 𝐼௜,௧ 𝐼௜,௧
VP -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.052*** -0.032***
(-10.22) (-9.97) (-4.25) (-5.73)
LEVERAGE -0.159*** -0.158*** -0.081*** -0.168***
(-17.05) (-16.99) (-4.68) (-10.74)
CASH 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.159** 0.082***
(4.94) (4.94) (2.44) (3.79)
SIZE -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.010* -0.110***
(-15.67) (-15.49) (-1.86) (-13.89)
RETURN 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.014 0.014***
(10.18) (10.11) (1.39) (5.17)
AGE -0.010* -0.010** -0.014** 0.015
(-1.86) (-1.99) (-1.98) (1.22)
𝐼௜,௧ିଵ 0.004 0.004 0.165** 0.008
(0.39) (0.40) (2.20) (0.39)
HHI -0.030***
(-3.05)
NUM 0.150
(1.42)
CENSUS HHI -0.090
(-1.47)
HP_HHI -0.068***
(-4.90)
CONSTANT 0.432*** 0.422*** 0.211*** 0.660***
(23.01) (22.71) (7.96) (17.08)
OBSERVATIONS 60,170 60,202 5,289 31,134
Firm Fixed Eﬀects Y Y N Y
Year Fixed Eﬀects Y Y Y Y
Adjusted 𝑅ଶ 0.279 0.279 0.049 0.285
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TABLE 2
Summary Statistics
e sample includes all Compustat annual data from 1980 to 2012. RETURN and AGE are constructed from CRSP.We
exclude regulated utilities (SIC 4900-4999) and financial firms (SIC 6000-6999). e upper part of the table summarizes
variables that are used in the optimal investment regression. Investment is deflated by total assets. VPmeasures growth
opportunity. LEVERAGE is the sum of the book value of short term and long-term debt divided by the sum of the
book value of total debt and equity. CASH is the balance of cash and short term investment scaled by total assets of
the firm. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. STOCK RETURN is the change of the market value of the firm. AGE is
calculated by the number of years the firm has been listed on CRSP. Next we present measures of ineﬃciency grouped
by the competition measure used in the first-stage estimation, followed by various measures for competition. In the
remaining part of the table, we report other variables that have been used.
Variable N Mean S.D. Min P25 P50 P75 Max
Investment Regression
಺೔,೟ 60202 0.10 0.27 -4.87 0.00 0.05 0.13 29.38
VP 60202 0.64 0.55 -2.54 0.30 0.55 0.89 3.40
LEVERAGE 60202 0.28 0.26 0.00 0.03 0.24 0.45 1.27
CASH 60202 0.21 0.25 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.29 1.53
SIZE 60202 4.75 1.93 0.50 3.34 4.63 6.03 10.66
RETURN 60202 0.21 0.72 -0.81 -0.24 0.05 0.43 4.59
AGE 60202 2.44 0.79 0.00 1.79 2.48 3.00 4.48
Eﬃciency
INF(HHI) 60170 0.08 0.19 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.09 25.60
INF(NUM) 60202 0.08 0.19 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.09 25.59
INF(CENSUS HHI) 5289 0.11 0.45 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.12 29.05
INF(HP_HHI) 31134 0.09 0.22 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.09 25.14
INF(EPCM) 59684 0.08 0.15 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.09 10.36
INF(TARIFF) 14911 0.08 0.16 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.09 5.12
INF(FREIGHT COST) 14911 0.08 0.16 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.09 5.12
INF(TRADE COST) 14911 0.08 0.16 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.09 5.12
Competition
HHI 60170 0.22 0.18 0.03 0.09 0.16 0.28 1.00
NUM 60202 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.29
CENSUS HHI 5289 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.30
HP_HHI 31134 0.21 0.22 0.01 0.07 0.12 0.27 1.00
EPCM 59684 -0.22 1.40 -12.73 -0.05 0.00 0.05 6.53
TARIFF 22707 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.68
FREIGHT COST 22707 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.06 1.40
TRADE COST 22707 0.09 0.07 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.11 1.60
Other Variables
TANGIBLE 60160 0.28 0.22 0.00 0.10 0.22 0.39 0.90
MTB 59442 1.70 1.79 0.11 0.79 1.15 1.90 28.45
FCF 48837 -0.05 0.33 -47.18 -0.12 -0.02 0.05 26.87
INFO 57886 0.82 0.19 0.00 0.75 0.89 0.95 1.00
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TABLE 6
Investment based on downstream analysis
e regression is as follows:
𝐼௜,௧ =𝛼 + 𝛽ଵDOWN_OUTPUT௞,௧ିଵ + 𝛽ଶDOWN_SALEG௞,௧ିଵ + 𝛽ଷDOWN_MTB௞,௧ିଵ
+ 𝛽ସDOWN_ANALYST௞,௧ିଵ + 𝛽ହCOMPETITION௝,௧ିଵ + 𝜂௧ + 𝜖௜,௧
Table 6 presents the result of the OLS investment regression. Column 1 uses HHI as the measure of competition.
Column 2 uses NUM as the measure of competition. Column 3 uses Census HHI as the measure of competition.
Column 4 uses Hoberg Philips HHI as the measure of competition. We use the fitted value of this regression as the
expected investment and the absolute value of residuals as the proxy for ineﬃciency. e sample covers firm-year
data from 1998 to 2012. Year fixed eﬀects are included. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
1 2 3 4
Variables 𝐼௜,௧ 𝐼௜,௧ 𝐼௜,௧ 𝐼௜,௧
DOWN_OUTPUT 0.019*** 0.006*** 0.028*** 0.021***
(10.97) (3.31) (4.53) (11.42)
DOWN_SALEG 0.040*** 0.054*** 0.088*** 0.042***
(3.40) (4.72) (3.13) (3.44)
DOWN_MTB 0.026*** 0.007** 0.014 0.026***
(7.11) (2.20) (1.60) (7.01)
DOWN_ANALYST 0.168*** 0.017 0.398*** 0.241***
(3.15) (0.31) (2.93) (4.23)
HHI -0.175***
(-20.95)
NUM 1.312***
(27.39)
CENSUS HHI 0.088
(1.37)
HP_HHI -0.109***
(-15.24)
CONSTANT -0.136*** -0.020 -0.332*** -0.180***
(-6.18) (-0.93) (-5.35) (-8.01)
Observations 15,555 15,558 1,683 14,655
Year Fixed Eﬀects Y Y Y Y
Adjusted 𝑅ଶ 0.051 0.102 0.077 0.046
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